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information obtained illegally or obtained legally and then
illegally misappropriated for personal use. Phillips & Zutz, supra
note 93, at 86-93; Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation:
A
General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information,
13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 122 (1984).
Under a constructive insider theory one "who knowingly
receives nonpublic material information from an insider has a
fiduciary duty to disclose before trading."
Dirks, 463 U.S. at
656. See Phillips & Zutz,
note 93, at 93-95.
The breach of duty under each of these theories, however, is
not to the investing public and, therefore, each is a rather
roundabout
way
of
protecting
the
public.
Under
the
misappropriation theory the wrong is to the rightful possessor of
the information. Under the constructive insider theory the wrong
is to the corporate shareholders.
111.
See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) ; Chiarella v . United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur C., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907 (1961).
112. An example of "mere good fortune" is inadvertently,
while waiting on line at the movies, overhearing a conversation
about a particular corporation's business, and then, in reliance on
the overheard information, buying shares of the corporation's
stock. The corporate information on which Chiarella traded, on the
other hand, was not obtained because of Chiarella's "mere good
fortune."
It was available to him because of his special
relationship as an employee of the corporation's printing
contractor.

CAN DEMAND NOTES REALLY
BE DEMANDED?

by
Peter M. Edelstein*
Introduction

Facts:

ABC Bank lends $100,000 to B. Benny.
B. Benny
and delivers to the bank a negotiable
note payable "on demand".
ABC later
demands payment.
B. Benny refuses.
ABC sues B.
Benny for $100,000. B. Benny defends on the grounds
that reasonable notice was required and not given.

Issue:

Whether a holder of a demand note can demand payment
at any time?

Decision:

Maybe •. . .

A "demand note" is an instrument payable on demand and
thos7 payable at sight or on presentation and those
no t7me for payment is stated. 1 By its nature, and
as reflected
long accepted case law and in the u c c
demand note entitles the holder to freely determine
tlm:
payment. In fa?t, such a note is actually due on the date
I_Rade,, and
has been suggested that its name is
no actual prior demand is necessary to
enforce payment.
.

Questions concerning a holder's ability to require
payment of f3
note at any time arise because of two
apparently
rules of law and because the intent
of the
not always clear. A two step analysis is
call7d. for:
(1) what is the effect of the applicable
of the Code? and, (2) what is the intent of th
e

*Professor of Law,,Pace University, Pleasantville, New York.
Member of
& Lochner, Armonk, New York.
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The Problem
u.c.c. Section 1 - 203,
a principle l?ng
part
of the common law of contracts, by imposing an obl1gat1on of
good faith with respect to all
by the
Code: "Every contract or duty w1 th1n th1s Act 1mposes an
obligation of good faith in its
enforcement."
Good faith is defined as "honesty 1n fact 1n the conduct or
transaction concerned 11 • 4 Since negotiable
are cover7d
in Article 3 (Commercial Paper) and secur1ty agreements 1n
Article 9 (Secured Transactions), one .could fairly
that
demand notes are subject to the requ1rement of good fa1th.
The Official Comment to Section 1-208, however, proves
this assumption to be incorrect.. Section 1-208,. entitled
"Option to Accelerate at Will", 1mposes the requ1rement of
good faith on a party, who among other things, desires to
accelerate payment or performance "at will" or "when
deems
himself insecure." The Official Comment states: "Obv1ously,
this section has no application. to
in.struments
very nature permit call at any t1me w1th or w1thout reason .
(emphasis added).
While the authors of the Code could have been more
precise by setting forth the two rules in the body of Article
2, the Official Comment is not unclear.
The
of
good faith simply does not
to
1nstruments.
Determining whether a demand instrument ex1sts, based on the
intent of the parties may not be so clear.
A "pure" demand note is simple and classic and by its
terms is due "on demand". In the absence of any inconsistent
language, either within or without the instrument, it may be
called at any time with or without reason. By contrast, there
is the note which was born as a demand note, but may have been
bastardized into something else.
Consider a demand note which contains a provision that
it is due on demand, but if no demand is made, .the note. is
payable "at a certain date"; or a demand note wh1ch
a default interest rate which is "due and payable at matur1ty,
on demand or otherwise"; or a demand note given in
with the execution and delivery of a loan agreement wh1ch
contains covenants, ratios, and other requirements, the
default of which constitutes an "event of default".
Since a court will look to the documents as a whole to
determine the intent of the parties, it might conclude when
reviewing the foregoing examples that the parties did not, in
fact
intend the instrument to be payable on demand.
The
court might wonder why the parties agreed to such additional
and unnecessary language if the note was really due on
These "demandable" types of notes have been labelled "impure"
demand notes and can become a lender's worst nightmare.

.
Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, addressed this
1ssue and concluded that the so-called "demand note" in
question was not entitled to be treated as one:
"First, the words "(o]n demand, and if no demand is
made, then on the" are printed on the form but
according .to the
s l .anguage the date
16, 1980 1s typewr1tten 1n.
Second the interest
rate is prime plus two but after
note becomes
"due and payable (whether at maturity on demand or
otherwise)" the interest rises to
plus three
paragraph 16 of the deed of trust
l1sts .e1ght events which constitute default.
The
deed 1tself recites 26 paragraphs of covenant by
The deed then states that defaults or
fa1lure to perform the covenants shall cause the
to
due and payable regardless of
Aga1n, we apply the court's analysis [in
an earl1er case] to underscore the point that a
demand
note
is,
on
issue,
due.
Further,
in the security ... agreement, agreed
that fa1lure to pay at maturity constituted default.
Therefore, had the note been a demand note it would
m.ature . and
Shaughnessy
would
have
been
1mmed1ately 1n default. Likewise, with the deed of
trust language, if this were a demand note, the note
would not need default for it to be due and payable
at the option of the bank.
It would already have
been due. 117
Once the conclusion is reached that the instrument
a117ged by the lender to be a demand instrument is not
to be treate? as such, the u.c.c. requirements of
good fa1th apply by v1rtue of u.c.c. Section 1-203.
In the
context of commercial instruments this means that "neither
party
which will have the effect of
destroy7ng or 1n)ur1ng the right of the other party to receive
the fru1ts of the contract". 8 This obligation to protect the
legal expectations of a party translates, in the case of
demand notes,into an obligation to give fair notice to the
borrower before requiring payment.
K:M.c. Co.,. v. Irving Trust Company/ did not directly
deal W1th the r1ght of the lender to demand its note but did
require "the
exercise of reasonableness" and "valid 1 business
10
judgment"
in electing to terminate a line of credit under
an agreement by which the loan was payable on demand.
K.M.c., a wholesale grocer, entered into a financing
agreement with.Irving .Trust Company ("Irving") whereby Irving
agreed.to . prov1de a l1ne of credit, in its discretion, up to
$3.5 m1ll1on. The loan was due on demand and was secured by
all of K. M. C. 's accounts receivables and inventory.
The
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proceeds of all of K.M.C.'s receivables were required to be
deposited into a "blocked account" to which only Irving had
access.
K.M.C. requested an advance of $800,000, which was
available under its line.
Irving,
which was
fully
collateralized, refused and eventually K. M.C. was forced to
liquidate its business.
K.M.C., in its lawsuit against Irving alleged, among
other things, that Irving
its implied. duty of
faith and fair dealing by term1nat1ng the l1ne w1thout not1ce.
Irving defended by arguing that since the line was due on
demand and that because advances were discretionary, it could
terminate the line at any time.
The court found for K.M.C. The jury awarded K.M.C. $7.5
million in damages on the theory
Ir;'ing breached;
implied duty of good faith and fa1r deal1ng by .not g1v1ng
K.M.C. notice of its intention to terminate the l1ne.
The court noted that even though the obligation of K. M.C.
was evidenced by a demand note (to which the
of
good faith under the. u.c.c. did not applX), pr?v1s1ons 1n the
loan agreements ind1cated that the part1es d1d
actually
intend the instrument to be due on demand. The ex1stence of
financial c.o venants and events of default required that Irving
exercise discretion, in good faith.
The court held:
"The record clearly established that a mediumsized company . . . such as K.M.C. could not
without outside financing.
Thus, the l1teral
interpretation of the financing agreement . . . as
supplemented by the "blocked account" mechanism,
would leave K.M.C.'s continued existence entirely
at the whim or mercy of Irving, absent an obligation
of good faith performance ...
Logically, at such
time as Irving might wish to curtail financing
K.M.C., as was its right under the agreement, this
obligation to act in good faith would require a
eriod of notice to K.M.C. to. allow
f . it a. reasonable
n11
P
opportunity to seek alternat1ve 1nanc1ng
Avoiding the Problem

The problem, once recognized, is subject to avoidance by
early and thorough attention to drafting.
If a pure demand
note is intended, care should be taken not to 1nclude any
language inconsistent with the right to demand at any time,
for any reason, or for no reason.
If the transaction requires a demand instrument together

with other; loan documents, use a pure demand instrument
together w1th clear and specific "saving" language in another
document stating that the note is due on demand, in all
events, . and that any other language is to be construed
for the lender's benefit and not in derogation
C?f
r1ght to demand without notice.
Any apparently
1ncons1stent language may be justified as serving to assure
the continued credit-worthiness of the borrower or to provide
borrower with notice of circumstances when the note is
l1kely to be called.
The issue will never arise if you use a time instrument
together with such due dates, events of default, default
interest rates and covenants, and like provisions, as you
wish.
Related Problems

"Dis
t'
d
. c:e.1onary
avances"
language is subject to an
analys1s s1m1lar to demand notes. Even where the language of
the loan
makes advances discretionary, the lender
may be requ1red, by the rules of good faith and commercial
(as in K.M.C.), to give the borrower fair
not1ce that future advances will not be made.
If
in the loan documents require commitment
fees or
payments, for example, a court might find
prov1s1ons 1nconsistent with the right to make
d1scret1onary advances , and infer an obligation on the part
of the lender to make the advances.
To avoid this issue, consider using language in the loan
which commit the lender to make the advances
making . them discretionary, but make the agreement
1n each 1nstance, to the borrower's satisfaction of
a
. of conditions
(ratios,
performance standards,
negative covenants, absence of default,
etc . ) wh1ch w1ll g1ve the lender sufficient comfort.
The right to accelerate the entire indebtedness in the
of default usually causes no problems.
The risk lies
w1th ti:e use of language permitting acceleration "at will" or
when 11 1nsecure".
The u.c.c., in Section 1-208, states that
lender may accelerate at will or when it deems itself
1nsecure only if it believes in good faith that the prospect
of payment or performance is impaired (emphasis added).
If the lender accelerates pursuant to an "acceleration
at.will" clause the file should support the belief in good
fa1th, that the loan is in jeopardy.
As noted
this
U.C.C.
section does not apply to demand instruments
ther7fore,
avoid the issue consider, when appropriate:
the 1nstrument as "demand' and avoiding the use of the
"at w1ll" language, or alternatively, using a time instrument
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with well-defined
standards.

events

of

default

tied

to

performance

ever voluntarily execute and deliver a demand note which could
have the effect, if demanded without notice of causing it
substantial economic difficulties?
'

Like the "acceleration at will" language, an "insecurity"
clause is subject to the provisions of u.c.c. Section 1-208,
requiring the lender to believe in good faith that the
prospect of repayment or performance is impaired . .
cover
this situation include in the loan documents a
of
"insecure" or 'set forth those acts or events which would
render the lender insecure; for example, state that a breach
of a covenant requiring certain financial ratios to be
maintained renders the lender insecure.
Your client's file
should then contain information evidencing the breach and
supporting the determination of insecurity before the loan is
called. Better yet, do not use or rely upon the"insecurity"
clause. Whatever would make the lender feel insecure should
be included as an event of default, in the case of a time
instrument: or use a pure demand instrument to which the
u.c.c. section does not apply.

4.

conclusion

5.

ENDNOTES

1.

2.
3.
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The K.M.C. decision and subsequent cases
constitute
notice to the bar that the courts will not consider the title
of the instrument to be determinative of the intent of the
parties.
If the instrument is a pure demand instrument and
there exists no documentary evidence indicating otherwise
(ratios, covenants, events of default, etc.), the courts will
not impose an obligation of good faith.
Where, however,
notwithstanding the title of the instrument, the intent of the
parties is clear from other related agreements, the instrument
may be held not to be a demand
but a "dema':ldable"
instrument, and subject to the obl1gat1ons of good fa1th.
At least one author has stated that"··· it is rarely,
if ever appropriate to document a commercial loan transaction
with a demand note ... ". 13 This suggestion surely deserves
more than casual consideration.
It is a common feeling by
lenders that a demand note gives them more control over their
money and its repayment.
They feel that by being able to
demand repayment at any time they can constantly.monit?r the
credit-worthiness of their borrowers.
Well, wh1le th1s may
seem to make sense, consider the following:
1.
Case law (K.M. C.) tells us that the demandable
instrument may not be subject to demand without reasonable
notice.

2.
The same control and monitoring can be obtained by
the use of time instruments with performance standards (tied
to events of default) covenants, and ratios.
3.
Most importantly, as a matter of fairness and
equity, what business person, dealing at arms length would
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